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PURDAH ON THE RATIONALE FOR CENTRAL BANK SILENCE AROUND POLICY MEETINGS

Non-technical summary
Central banks around the globe are pursuing not only different policy objectives, but they also have in place vastly different strategies of conveying policy and communicating with the public. Despite these differences, however, there is one element that most central banks share, at least among advanced economies. This element is the purdah, the practice of a selfimposed, voluntary guideline to abstain from communicating in the period around monetary policy decisions and other important events. The existence of such a practice is remarkable in several ways. At first sight, it seems to contradict the virtue of transparency which has become the hallmark of virtually all progressive central banks today, as it requires withholding information from the public when such information is sought after intensely and would likely affect financial markets substantially.
Why then do central banks pursue such a policy? Remarkably little official information about this practice is provided by central banks, partly reflecting the fact that the purdah is mostly not an official rule but a voluntary guideline, created by the members of the policy-setting committees themselves. The information that is available on this practice indicates that an important rationale for the purdah is the fear that communication just before policy meetings or other important events may create excessive market volatility and unnecessary speculation.
The paper assesses this issue for the Federal Reserve, for which a purdah has been in place at least since the early 1980s, nowadays for the 7 days before and 3 days after Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, as well as before the Chairman's semi-annual testimony to Congress. For our empirical analysis, we exploit the fact that statements do occasionally reach financial markets during the blackout period. Examples for such instances comprise delayed reporting of statements that were made after market closure on the last day prior to the purdah, pre-scheduled obligatory speaking engagements during the purdah such as testimonies (only observed in the earlier parts of our sample), unintentional or at times possibly intentional statements. This paper does not look into the underlying motivations for such statements, as we are only interested in understanding their impact on financial markets.
We study the impact of communication on the level as well as the conditional volatility of interest rates along the US yield curve. We find that short-term interest rates react three to four times more strongly to statements reported in the pre-FOMC purdah (immediately before FOMC meetings) than during other times. Furthermore, statements reported in the pre-FOMC purdah tend to raise market volatility while those in the post-FOMC purdah (in the days following FOMC meetings) or outside the purdah tend to lower volatility. Therefore communication appears to have fundamentally different implications for market uncertainty depending on its timing.
The empirical findings have several implications. Taking a broader perspective, the results underline that the timing of communication matters for its impact on financial markets. The excessive sensitivity of financial market participants to communication in the purdah prior to FOMC meetings suggests that central banks might indeed be well advised to observe this rule. By contrast, post-FOMC purdah statements mostly reduce the conditional variance of interest rate movements, thus suggesting that they are at least partly successful in lowering uncertainty and settling markets. Communication immediately after policy surprises in particular may be an effective policy tool.
As the purdah concerns only a relatively short period of time, the findings of this paper are not applicable to guide central banks' communication policies outside this restricted time window. Nonetheless, the analysis of this special event provides relevant lessons about the limits to central bank transparency.
Introduction
Why then do central banks pursue such a policy? Remarkably little official information about this practice is provided by central banks, partly reflecting the fact that the purdah is mostly not an official rule but a voluntary guideline, created by the members of the policy-setting committees themselves. The information that is available on this practice indicates that an important rationale for the purdah is the fear that communication just before policy meetings or other important events may create excessive market volatility and "unnecessary speculation" (Federal Reserve 1982 , 1995 Bank of England 2000) . This presumably may not only be detrimental from a financial market perspective, but it may also narrow the options for committees in their policy decisions. Similarly, statements by individual committee members just after a policy decision may be feared to "dilute" the message of the decision (Federal Reserve 1995) .
These arguments underline that at times and under certain circumstances central banks consider communication to be undesirable -even if, or precisely because they have superior information -thus stressing the limits to central bank transparency. The paper assesses this practice for the Federal Reserve, for which a purdah has been in place at least since the early 1980s, nowadays for the 7 days before and 3 days after Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, as well as before the Chairman's semi-annual testimony to Congress 1 For our empirical analysis, we exploit the fact that statements do occasionally reach financial markets during the blackout period. Examples for such instances comprise delayed reporting of statements that were made after market closure on the last day prior to the purdah, prescheduled obligatory speaking engagements during the purdah such as testimonies (only observed in the earlier parts of our sample), unintentional or at times possibly intentional statements. This paper does not look into the underlying motivations for such statements, as we are only interested in understanding their impact on financial markets.
We study the impact of communication on the level as well as the conditional volatility of interest rates along the US yield curve. We find that short-term interest rates react three to four times more strongly to statements reported in the pre-FOMC purdah (immediately before FOMC meetings) than during other times. A further revealing finding is that statements by FOMC members reported in the pre-FOMC purdah tend to raise market volatility while those in the post-FOMC purdah (in the days following FOMC meetings) or outside the purdah tend to lower volatility. Therefore communication appears to have fundamentally different implications for market uncertainty depending on its timing.
Moreover, communication that is reported during the blackout period (which we will call "purdah communication" or "purdah statements" for simplicity) moves interest rates differently from other communication primarily at the short end of the maturity spectrum.
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February 2008 This is indicative that market participants focus more strongly on the current monetary policy stance than on the longer-term outlook for policy in such instances. Finally, the market impact of purdah communication is directly linked to the monetary policy environment in which it occurs. In particular, purdah statements immediately following an FOMC decision that came as a surprise for financial markets have a substantially larger effect on the level of US interest rates and reduce market volatility much more strongly.
The empirical findings have several implications. Taking a broader perspective, the results underline that the timing of communication -not just relative to policy meetings, but more generally dependent on the market conditions -is of crucial importance when shaping communication policies. The excessive sensitivity of financial market participants to communication in the purdah prior to FOMC meetings suggests that central banks might indeed be well advised to observe this rule. These statements seem detrimental as they move markets excessively, and at the same time raise market volatility substantially, thus providing support for central banks' claims that such communication creates excessive volatility. By contrast, post-FOMC purdah statements mostly reduce the conditional variance of interest rate movements, thus suggesting that they are at least partly successful in lowering uncertainty and settling markets. Communication immediately after policy surprises in particular may be an effective policy tool.
Beyond these implications for policy makers, the paper adds to the recent literature on monetary policy, transparency and communication. One important strand of this literature has focused on the issue of incomplete, asymmetric or noisy information. In the work by Morris and Shin (2002) and Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) , transparency may be detrimental to welfare because of the noisiness of the information coupled with central banks' focal role as market coordinator; although Svensson (2006) challenges that central bank information may not be sufficiently noisier than private information. In a similar vein, Faust and Leeper (2005) , Cukierman (2006) , Rudebusch and Williams (2006) and Gosselin, Lotz and Wyplosz (2007) show the potentially welfare-reducing effects of central bank transparency in an environment of information asymmetries or heterogeneity. Moreover, an important part of the literature has focused on the overall quality of information available to central banks (Romer and Romer 2000, Orphanides 2003) .
A different strand of the literature stresses the role of the market environment for transparency to be effective and desirable. Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) , Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Woodford (2005) emphasize that Fed communication was crucial when there was a deflationary risk for the US economy. Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) analyze the announcement of FOMC decisions, in particular the effectiveness of the balance-of-risks assessments since May 1999, and show that the bias has indeed been an effective guide of market expectations about the path of monetary policy.
A final area is the rapidly growing empirical literature on understanding how central bank transparency and communication affect financial markets. Overall, there has been compelling evidence that communication exerts a substantial impact (Guthrie and Wright 2000 , Kohn and Sack 2004 , Reinhart and Sack 2006 , Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007b , though an open question remains to what extent central banks really intend to move financial markets.
The present paper broadly fits into these three areas, but it is also distinct in several ways. In particular, the argument presented here in an empirical setting is that there may be important instances when central bank information is vastly superior, but still communication may be welfare-reducing and thus such information is withheld, or at least channeled in a specific manner. Moreover, the paper stresses the importance of the market environment and the endogeneity of the effects of communication. As the purdah concerns only a relatively short period of time, the findings of this paper are not applicable to guide central banks'
Institutional Design of the Purdah Period
The word 'purdah' originally comes from Urdu and Hindi, and literally means 'curtain'. It refers to the practice of preventing men from seeing women, which is followed in some Islamic countries and among some groups of society in India. It traditionally has taken two forms, one the practice of women concealing their bodies and faces, and another the physical segregation of men and women (see e.g. Wikipedia 2008). In the Western world, the term seems to have first been used in the UK, with reference to the practice of withholding relevant information about the UK budget or just before general elections.
The term has also increasingly been used informally with reference to central banks. • The period is inclusive of both Fridays, running from midnight to midnight.
• In addition, in the four months when the Inflation Report publication and press conference take place (February, May, August and November) the purdah extends to midnight at the end of the day of publication.
• The guideline also precludes publication during purdah of any interview given beforehand.
• Other senior executives within the Bank also generally adhere to the guideline."
Although no such official statements are available for most central banks, including the Federal Reserve, transcripts of various FOMC meetings over the past few decades provide some information about the purdah practice, its rationale and objectives for the FOMC.
The study of FOMC transcripts shows that the purdah practice for the Federal Reserve goes back at least to the early 1980s, to a time when FOMC members talked relatively freely to the media immediately before and after FOMC decisions. The transcripts indicate that some journalists went so far as to do a "round-robin" of calling all 19 FOMC members before a meeting, thereby obtaining a fairly accurate understanding of the likely debate in the FOMC and its outcome (Federal Reserve 1982 , 1995 , see Appendix A1 and A2)
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February 2008 An important FOMC meeting that clarified a number of details, and also introduced some changes, to the purdah or blackout period was the FOMC meeting of January 31-February 1, 1995. In 1994, Chairman Greenspan had appointed a four-member sub-committee on FOMC disclosure policy, chaired by then-Governor Alan Blinder, which had been asked to review FOMC disclosure practices and possibly suggest changes. The sub-committee tackled four main issues, including first, the practices surrounding the announcements made by the FOMC after each meeting since February 1994; second, tapes and transcripts made of FOMC meetings and their release; third, the release of minutes of FOMC meetings; and the issue of the blackout period of communication by FOMC members.
Several issues require clarification regarding the purdah period. A first issue is what type of information the purdah period excludes from being discussed publicly. It obviously concerns monetary policy issues, but even in the FOMC discussion on this question in 1995 it was not clear to all FOMC members whether this includes also information about the economic outlook and the forecast. During this meeting, it was confirmed that it includes all types of information that are relevant for monetary policy decisions, including the overall condition of the economy (Federal Reserve 1995, see Appendix A4).
As a second issue -the length of the purdah period -it lasts from seven days before an FOMC meeting, which usually take place on Tuesdays, till the end of the week of the meeting. In fact, the FOMC at its January 31-February 1, 1995, meeting decided to shorten the blackout period after FOMC meetings from 7 days to about three days, as it was felt that the purdah period was relatively long under the previous practice, covering one third of the usual six-week length of a typical inter-meeting period. In addition, a third element of the blackout guideline is the period between FOMC meetings and the Humphrey-Hawkins testimonies, since 2000 called Semiannual Monetary Policy Report of the FOMC Chairman to Congress. These testimonies take place twice a year, usually in February and in July, and the purdah guideline indicates that there should be no communication by FOMC members between the previous FOMC meeting and the testimony during those two months.
A third point concerns the motivation for the purdah guideline. The rationale is obviously somewhat different depending on whether the guideline concerns the time before or after FOMC meetings, or before the monetary policy testimonies. From the transcripts of past FOMC meetings it appears that one concern is that communication immediately before monetary policy decisions may create excessive market speculation and market volatility, which moreover may narrow the options of the committee. This is also expressed in the Bank of England statement above, which talks about "unnecessary speculation". By contrast, a major concern for communication immediately after FOMC meetings is that "the thrust of the announced decision of the Committee then gets diluted" by these statements, as expressed by Mr. Greenspan (Federal Reserve 1995, see Appendix A5) . Moreover, the rationale for not communicating before the monetary policy testimonies is not to "preempt" or possibly even contradict the information the Chairman is going to give to Congress (see Appendix A6).
As transcripts are released only with a five-year delay and given the unofficial character of the guideline, it is hard to say whether there have been any changes in the Federal Reserve's purdah guideline since 2002. However, from the actual practice and the few comments by FOMC members on this issue, it appears that the blackout guideline continues to be in place.
As a final note, it is interesting that in the transcript of the January 31-February 1, 1995, meeting, it was acknowledged that the purdah "has not worked 100 percent" (Federal Reserve 1995, p. 35) . The objective of the remainder of the paper is therefore to investigate the effects of purdah communication on financial markets to assess whether there is empirical support for the argument that purdah communication might create excessive volatility. 
Measuring Communication
As to the data on communication, our objective is to extract all relevant public statements by the FOMC as a whole as well as by its individual members in the entire inter-meeting period, i.e. both within and outside the purdah. The database was originally developed in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) , and was extended through June 2007 for the present paper. The methodology behind the database is explained in detail in Appendix B, while we give only a summary outline in this section. We intentionally take a financial market perspective and attempt to measure all information financial market participants receive about statements by the FOMC members. We therefore chose ReutersNews, one of the dominant newswire services, as a data source from which to extract all statements about the monetary policy inclination or the economic outlook by the FOMC members. Only statements by the committee as a whole, such as on FOMC meeting days or the release of the Minutes, and statements by FOMC members on such days are excluded from the analysis.
As a next issue, we classify each statement into whether it implies an inclination towards an easing, a tightening or no bias concerning monetary policy (assigning the values -1, 1 and 0, respectively; for instance, a concern about higher inflation would constitute an inclination towards tightening, a statement about a weakening economic outlook an inclination towards easing). Such a classification is valuable because it allows us to test whether statements exert a significant effect on the mean of asset prices, rather than only on the volatility. A key difficulty is clearly how to ensure that the classification is done correctly and reflects market participants' understanding of the message. As outlined in more detail in Appendix B, we use content analysis to achieve this classification, which implies having different individuals classify the statements independently and discarding those that are not unanimous. Nevertheless, the classification of the great majority of statements was unanimous. statement can be published during a blackout period. In our database, there are a number of instances where a statement was made on the evening of the last day prior to the purdah, for instance on the occasion of a dinner speech. As markets had closed by the time of the event, these statements often get reported upon on the next morning, i.e. within the purdah. At the beginning of our sample period, we also observe purdah statements made on the occasion of pre-scheduled, obligatory speaking engagements such as testimonies. Of course, there might also be misreporting or misunderstandings, such that a statement that was not intended to fall under the purdah guidelines is reported on in a way that makes it look like a purdah statement. As misunderstandings might also occur during our own classification, Appendix C provides the relevant statements contained in our database, allowing the interested reader to crosscheck our classification. Finally, statements might also be due to intentional efforts to convey important information to markets. In this paper, we do not take a stand on the underlying reasons; we take the observed statements as our starting point, with the objective of analyzing their effect on financial markets. This is what we turn to next.
Purdah communication and financial market reactions
We now turn to analyzing the effects of communication on financial markets and the question whether statements reported in the blackout period are special in this regard. We study the effect of communication on the level as well as the volatility of asset prices, in particular interest rates along the yield curve. For that purpose, we estimate an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) model, following Nelson (1991) , to test for the effect of statements on both the conditional mean as well as on the conditional variance of asset prices at a daily frequency. An EGARCH(1,1) model is sufficient to address the non-normality of the data, in particular the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of the daily interest rate series. The conditional mean equation is formulated as such that the conditional variance of US interest rate changes (h t ) is a function of the past variance (h t-1 ) and past innovations ( t-1 ), as well as a communication dummy CD k t that takes the value 1 on all days a communication event is observed, and 0 otherwise, and the day-ofthe-week effects z t . The model is estimated via maximum likelihood, using a Simplex algorithm to obtain initial values and the BHHH and BFGS algorithms for optimization.
Our interest lies in particular with two parameters, namely β and λ. A first hypothesis suggests that H 0 : β k >0, i.e. that communication has an effect on the level of US interest rates, and in the expected direction (whereby "easing statements" lower interest rates, and "tightening statements" raise them). This should hold for all parts of the inter-meeting period alike. In contrast, the hypothesis of elevated market sensitivity would suggest that β purdah >β nopurdah . Unfortunately, such a pattern could arise due to two reasons, however. First, it would result if purdah communication indeed would lead to stronger market reactions. Second, and observationally equivalent, it would emerge if the information contained in the communication during the purdah carried a different information content. These two factors are very difficult to distinguish, and we can only provide indirect evidence in that regard.
Finally, we do not have a prior on whether communication would increase or reduce volatility; however, the hypothesis that purdah communication carries the risk of triggering excess volatility would imply that λ purdah >λ no-purdah . 3 Unlike in the case of the mean equation, we are not aware of an alternative explanation that could generate this relationship, such that this test is able to provide clear-cut evidence about the excess volatility hypothesis. markets are generally much more sensitive to statements made shortly before FOMC meetings -although we still need to check whether the competing hypothesis of a fundamentally different information content of the two types of communication gets supported by the data. We will return to this later on.
An interesting difference is present for the conditional variance of US interest rates. Communication in the pre-FOMC purdah tends to raise market volatility, while statements in the post-FOMC purdah period and outside the purdah lower it significantly. This suggests that the timing of statements is important. In particular, communication just before FOMC meetings raises volatility, whereas statements immediately following FOMC decisions tend to help settle markets by lowering interest rate volatility.
Figures 1-2
We next extend the analysis to the full maturity spectrum of US interest rates. Figure 1 shows the point estimates and 90% confidence intervals for the impact of pre-FOMC purdah, post-FOMC purdah, and no-purdah statements on the level of interest rates ranging from 1 month to 20 years. Figure 2 provides the same information for the conditional variance. The main finding of the figures is that the differences across types of statements are largest at the short end of the maturity spectrum, which become somewhat smaller and in some cases statistically insignificant beyond 1-year maturities. For instance, the coefficients for pre-FOMC purdah and no-purdah statements on the level of US interest rates are significantly different up to 1 year, but converge and become equal at the long end of the yield curve. Even more striking is the convergence process for the conditional variances shown in Figure 2 as differences to pre-FOMC purdah statements are very large up to 1-year interest rates and then disappear thereafter.
Figure 3
How robust are these results? We conduct a battery of robustness tests and extensions to check whether and how these benchmark findings may change. In particular, given the limited sample size for purdah statements, we need to ensure that the point estimates are not driven by a few outliers. Figure 3 shows the histogram for the distribution of interest rate responses on communication days during the purdah (Figure 3 .A) and on communication days outside the purdah (Figure 3 .B), for 6-month interest rates. Most importantly, there are no outliers that appear to drive the results. Second, we more directly control for other factors that may drive interest rates on communication days by including in the vector of controls z t a set of 12 important US macroeconomic announcement shocks. 5 The results of Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 are basically unchanged when such news shocks are included, suggesting that at least such news do not systematically affect the findings for FOMC communication. Third, we test for parameter stability over time. Keeping in mind the limitations imposed by the small sample, we split the sample in May 1999 when the FOMC changed its communication strategy by providing a bias statement with its decisions, which in turn could mean that purdah communication (at least in the post-meeting purdah) may have become less relevant. However, the point estimates of Table 2 are not statistically significantly different when taking this sample split, confirming the robustness of the findings also from this perspective.
Returning to the analysis, what the findings indicate so far is that market reactions to communication in the different parts of the inter-meeting period are fundamentally different.
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On the one hand, the evidence about increasing volatility in the pre-FOMC purdah clearly supports the notion of purdah-communication creating excessive volatility. On the other hand, the fact that communication in the pre-FOMC purdah raises interest rate levels by more than otherwise, as well as that the differences in the effects on the level of interest rates are largest for the short end of the maturity spectrum could be due to two reasons. Either markets attach stronger weights to this information, and try to distill in particular information on the current monetary policy stance rather than on the longer-term outlook for policy, or purdah statements contain fundamentally different information, e.g. about upcoming decisions which helps market participants to better anticipate decisions. Table 3 A first reason why it is most likely not the information content that differs lies in our construction of the dataset. By searching exclusively for statements that bear the name of an FOMC member, we neglect statements by "senior Fed officials", which are often assumed to be a means to get important information to markets without having to go through the standard communication channels. For these types of statements information content might well be different. 6 Second, in order to further get at this issue, and to see how robust the results are, we extend our analysis by distinguishing between different conditions under which statements are made. Due to the small number of observations of purdah communication, a further split is bound to lead to small samples, likely affecting the significance of our results. Table 3 shows the impact of statements conditional on the characteristics of the surrounding FOMC decisions. A number of striking findings stand out. First, the effects of pre-FOMC purdah statements on the level of interest rates do not depend on whether or not policy rates will be changing at the upcoming meeting. We take this as suggestive evidence that the information contained in the pre-FOMC purdah statements is not fundamentally different from other communication; if it were, we would expect to see larger effects on interest rates if an interest rate change was in the offing. We stress that this interpretation of the finding is merely suggestive as it assumes that interest rate changes are less anticipated than decisions where rates are kept unchanged. While this is in general the case for the full sample period, it obviously may not hold for each individual meeting.
Second, statements in the post-FOMC purdah period have a substantially larger effect when the last decision entailed a surprise for market participants. This holds both for the conditional mean and the conditional volatility of interest rates, and is suggestive that there is scope for FOMC members to clarify a given decision beyond the FOMC statement accompanying its announcement.
Finally, the impact of statements on the level of interest rates is mostly larger when market uncertainty (as measured through the degree of interest rate volatility in the inter-meting period) is high. This is suggestive that communication appears to add more information when such uncertainty is high. By contrast, statements in many cases raise the conditional variance of interest rates. The exception is again the post-FOMC purdah communication, which helps to lower the conditional interest rate variance. In summary, communication by FOMC members appears to be a highly effective tool to guide financial markets. The empirical results of this section indicate that statements reported in the purdah period of the FOMC generally have a much larger impact on financial markets than statements made in the inter-meeting period outside the blackout period. This confirms that markets at the time around FOMC decisions are more sensitive to new information from the FOMC; this finding applies generally to pre-FOMC purdah communication, and also to post-FOMC purdah communication when the preceding decisions came as a surprise.
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Conclusions
The purdah is a widespread practice among modern central banks, but to our knowledge no work has so far been undertaken to understand the rationale for this practice and to verify it empirically. The objective of the paper has been to fill this gap, in particular as transparency and communication have become important elements of many central banks' work, and the purdah a relevant element of communication strategies. More importantly, the study of the special nature of the purdah offers a unique perspective on central bank communication and the limits to transparency.
The paper has shown that purdah statements before FOMC meetings have a large effect on US interest rates, about three to four times larger than those in the inter-meeting period outside the purdah, and tend to increase market volatility significantly. Both findings provide support for the argument by several central bank committees that markets tend to be more sensitive around policy decisions, and that statements in such a period may induce excessive market volatility. While the case for having a purdah arrangement prior to committee meetings therefore finds strong support, we also find that statements immediately after FOMC meetings lead to a sizable reduction in market volatility, in particular if the preceding decision was largely unexpected. This suggests that there is scope for FOMC members to clarify a given decision beyond the initial FOMC statement announcing it.
We are aware that the purdah concerns only a relatively short period of time, and that the findings here are not applicable to guide central banks' communication policies outside this restricted time window. Nonetheless, the analysis of this special event suggests that there can be cases where an appropriate reception of the information content of central bank communication is not ensured. This special case study therefore yields important insights into the limits to central bank transparency. "MR. COYNE. This goes back, I would say, 15 years when there was a lot of discussion in the press stemming from comments made by various members of the Committee both before and after an FOMC meeting. Some of the papers liked to do a summary story immediately before the meeting. They would do a round-robin, calling all 19 people. They would compare answers and try to figure out what was going to happen. We were asked to put together some informal guidelines. These are not "rules" of the Committee. They are simply guidelines that I have propagated to the Committee. The purpose was to help the Committee deal with the press in sensitive periods. One of the things we came up with, that the then-Chairman agreed with, was this blackout period. People were not to talk to the press a week before and a week after a Committee meeting. … "
A2: Federal Reserve 1982 (p. 54)
"CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. … Joe Coyne might just talk a minute about his understanding of the rules and then we'll have a more general discussion of this or of any ideas anybody else might have.
MR. COYNE. To be brief, my understanding is that the policy record, of course, comes out the Friday after the following meeting, and what that means is that we do not talk about what happened at that [earlier] meeting until that time. There are very, very, few exceptions to that. We can say we had a meeting: we can give the starting time and the closing time, and the attendance. And that's it. That has been my understanding since the Committee adopted the rules."
A3: Federal Reserve 1995 (p. 35)
"MR. COYNE. … The purpose was to try to prevent all the speculation in the press and subsequently in the market about what the Committee would do. Now, we still get that speculation, but we get it from commentators. We do not get it from members of the Committee anymore. It has worked to an extent. It has not worked 100 percent. But a lot of members of the Committee use the blackout period to avoid talking to the press during these sensitive periods."
A4: Federal Reserve 1995 (pp. 35-36)
"MR. COYNE. Someone asked whether it just covered monetary policy. It was supposed to cover monetary policy and the economy --things that the Committee discusses when it is formulating monetary policy.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. My impression is that if a reasonably good reporter gets one of us to sit and discuss what is going on in the economy, it is a farce for us to say, "I won't discuss monetary policy but let me tell you what is going on in the economy." It is a farce because, while it may be that in the old days reporters were not very knowledgeable, many of the current breed have MAs and PhDs in economics." "MR. COYNE. … If you are going to make the blackout period asymmetrical, I would say make it asymmetrical to the Friday following the meeting rather than for just two days. If it is only two days, then everybody will jump on it after 48 hours, and we are still going to get a lot of different comments. One of the problems is, if someone comments one way, as Mr. Forrestal just said, somebody else is going to try to jump the other way. Then we are going to get more and more people commenting.
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. So, in a sense, the thrust of the announced decision of the Committee then gets diluted in the same way that consenting statements would do that."
A6: Federal Reserve 1995 (p. 38)
"VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. … That can be between the meeting and the Humphrey-Hawkins testimony because we do not want to preempt what the Chairman is likely to say."
A7: Federal Reserve 1982 (pp. 53-54)
"CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. … I might also say that we had a leak-and may be more than one -about the Greenbook, as you know. … I am convinced that in a way it enormously complicates the policy problem because so much of policy is what people think it is or think our attitude is over a period of time as opposed to what we do. This whole situation is intolerable to me. This organization, above all others in Washington --… --does not leak. And I think it has been to our advantage to have that be both the impression and the reality. It has enormously increased our credibility, the credibility of official statements over the years, and the credibility of policy. I don't see any way we can operate other than on that presumption. …"
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Appendix B: Measuring central bank communication
For the measurement of communication, our analysis is based on the data developed and described in more detail in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) . The objective is to obtain all communication events by FOMC members that contain statements which are relevant to infer information about their monetary policy inclination. We use the newswire service Reuters News to extract these statements, along with a time stamp indicating the day on which they occur. We are careful in focusing on forward-looking statements and in avoiding duplication of statements in the database. The extraction is done in a mechanical manner using a set of search words, including the name of the policy maker together with the words interest rates, monetary policy, inflation, economy or economic outlook. This classification follows the examples of Guthrie and Wright (2000) and Kohn and Sack (2004) .
As a final step, we classify the statements by the committee members into those that indicate an inclination towards monetary policy tightening, those that suggest an easing, and those that are neutral: n inclinatio ing eas n inclinatio no n inclinatio tightening
The classification of the statements is important and thus needs a more detailed discussion. The technique of extracting meaning from language is often referred to as content analysis (e.g. Holsti 1969 ). The idea of content analysis is to devise a number of rules to provide a clean classification and to minimize the number of false classifications. In our case, the statements have been double-checked by the authors and independently by the research analyst. In case there was a disagreement on the classification, other reports were used to classify the statement. A statement was discarded if no agreement could be reached. Overall, most statements were judged to be unanimous and only a relatively small number of statements was excluded from the analysis.
Nevertheless, a number of additional caveats should be stressed at this point. First, the list of statements included in our database may not capture all statements by all committee members as Reuters News may be selective in its reporting. Second, statements by policy-makers may be misreported or be misinterpreted by the markets, and may thus trigger a reaction that is undesired by the policy maker. Although we recognize the potential relevance of these caveats, for the purpose of this study we are primarily interested in the information that market participants receive, and thus we are less concerned for instance by the fact that newswire services may decide not to report all statements. McTeer added that the Dallas Fed's own estimate is of an upward bias of 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent, which would bring the current inflation rate down to around 1.0 percent. But he stressed that the goal is to push inflation even lower to the point where it is completely eradicated. "Five percent short-term interest rates do not seem all that burdensome to me. I think if the economy has an impulse to grow, it will grow." McTeer described the current unemployment rate of 5.5 percent as "fairly low." Concerning recent figures on industrial production and capacity utilization, McTeer said they were "strong but not overly strong."
Greenspan, 27.03.96 "Recent economic data suggest that the economy should be able to continue operating at a high level ..., sustaining growth without risking a reversal of progress that has been made toward ... price stability," he said.
McTeer, 15.08.96 The U.S. economy is "without noticeable stress or strains," he said in a speech delivered at the Buenos Aires stock exchange. … he said both the federal funds rate and long Treasury yields were "certainly in the neighborhood of being reasonable." Note: The table shows the EGARCH estimates of the effects of statements in the pre-FOMC purdah, the post-FOMC purdah, and those outside the purdah period on the conditional mean and the conditional variance for US 6-month interest rates. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. "y" indicates that the coefficient in a given row is significantly (at the 90% level) different from the corresponding coefficient in the row indicated by the number in brackets in the Note: Distinguishing between FOMC meeting characteristics, the table shows the EGARCH estimates of the effects of statements in the pre-FOMC purdah, the post-FOMC purdah, and those outside the purdah period on the conditional mean and the conditional variance for US 3-month interest rates. An interest rate surprise is defined to be present whenever the unexpected component of an FOMC decision -measured as the mean of Reuters survey expectations -exceeds its sample mean (which is 3.7 basis points over the whole sample period). Interest rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation of daily movements of 3-month rates in the inter-meeting period before the purdah. "High" volatility is defined for each period when this variable exceeds its sample mean over the whole period, and "low" when it is below. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, respectively. "y" indicates that the two respective coefficients in each row are significantly different at the 90% level.
